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Abstract
Scholars have long been interested in when and to what degree managers are able to exert control over their
organizations. In this review, we examine managerial discretion, or the latitude of action available to managers.
Since its introduction, scholars have attempted to explain when managers will have discretion, what discretion
means for organizational outcomes, and how discretion may differentially influence organizational outcomes
when it enables or constrains leaders. Our review indicates that while a significant number of studies have
examined discretion, few have attempted to validate the prescriptions of the managerial discretion construct.
Furthermore, studies to date have primarily focused on the industry task environment as a measure of
discretion, with less attention focused on the manager’s characteristics and the internal organization. We then
assess construct validity and the measurement of managerial discretion, offering recommendations to future
researchers for improving the operationalization of this construct. Finally, we consider how discretion forces
may interact as either complements or substitutes and how such interactions may have both organizational- and
individual-level consequences.

Keywords managerial discretion, executive discretion, CEOs, top management team, latitude of
action, discretionary forces
How and when do leaders matter? Management scholars have long attempted to identify when managers can
alter firm decisions, actions, and performance. While management theorists have long implicitly understood the
role of constraints in the ability of firms and managers to undertake decisions (see, e.g., Hannan & Freeman,
1977; Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977), it was not until Hambrick and Finkelstein’s
(1987) conceptualization of “managerial discretion” that scholars formally developed a model for what factors
may provide executives with the ability to influence firm outcomes. Managerial discretion can be defined as the
latitude of managerial action available to a decision maker (e.g., a top manager) in a given situation (Hambrick &
Finkelstein). Higher discretion enables leaders with a wider range of options (J. T. Campbell, Campbell, Sirmon,
Bierman, & Tuggle, 2012) and a greater latitude of action (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995). Because top
managers are appointed to executive positions with the goals of sustaining and improving organizational
performance and effectiveness (Barker, Patterson, & Mueller, 2001), it is critical to understand what constrains
leaders and, alternatively, to understand what enables them to influence organizational outcomes.
In this review, we seek to examine how research has advanced the concept of managerial discretion and explore
both its antecedents and consequences. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) argued that managerial discretion
comes from sources at three levels: the environment, the organization, and the individual. A majority of
managerial discretion research focuses on the role of the task environment, or industry characteristics, in
creating managerial discretion. Indeed, only one literature review to date has examined managerial discretion
(Boyd & Gove, 2006). That review focuses solely on the measurement of discretion based upon Dess and Beard’s
(1984) depiction of the task environment. We seek to more broadly examine managerial discretion research to
advance understanding of discretion’s antecedents. Additionally, our review illustrates that research on the
direct consequences of managerial discretion primarily focuses on executive compensation and firm
performance. Since much of the research looking at the consequences of managerial discretion also focuses on
the task environment, we feel there is tremendous opportunity to better understand the consequences from
discretionary forces within an organization and from an executive’s psychological attributes.
Coming more than 25 years after Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) introduction of managerial discretion, we
illustrate how the concept has progressed, been measured in studies, and where future research should address
gaps in the field’s knowledge. We provide several contributions to the managerial discretion literature. First, we
illustrate where research has identified value in the managerial discretion construct, while also illustrating
where the initial construct remains untested. Second, we highlight opportunities for future research to extend
the concept that will allow research on managerial discretion to continue progressing and provide greater
influence. In particular, little research has focused on microconcepts, such as executive personality or cognition.
Consideration of such topics may explain why some top executives perceive and act on opportunities or threats
to the firm while others do not.
In the remainder of this review, we provide background on managerial discretion and its theoretical
underpinnings. Next, we summarize our review methodology. While many of managerial discretion’s concepts
are applicable to divisional general managers and, in some cases, functional and middle managers, we focus on
CEOs and top management team (TMT) members since almost all discretion research has been focused on top
executives. We then review how managerial discretion has been used as an independent variable, as a
dependent variable, and as a moderator and mediator to examine relationships between top managers and
firm-level outcomes. Finally, we conclude with an analysis of gaps in managerial discretion research and
recommend future research directions.

Historical Background of the Managerial Discretion Construct
As noted earlier, managerial discretion is the latitude of action, or potential strategic options, afforded to
executives. While Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) developed the seminal managerial discretion model
employed in management research, the concept existed in several forms for many years prior to their article.
Sociology, for instance, offers a comparable view of managerial discretion. Lieberson and O’Connor
(1972)argued that the leadership effect in organizations accounts for variance in organizational performance,
but that organizational progress and success over time are shaped by the leader’s traits and constrained by the
organization’s characteristics and environment. In their study, Lieberson and O’Connor empirically examined
positions in prior research arguing that in complex organizations there are a multitude of forces that constrain or
magnify a leader’s effect (Guest, 1962; Thompson, 1967). They found that managers act in a substantially
differing role in affecting organizational performance across industries and organizations, with the quality of
management having less effect on established companies and a greater effect in new or recently merged
organizations.
Managerial discretion acts as a bridge between two previously conflicting organizational theories: population
ecology and strategic choice (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Population ecology theorists argue that
organizations are inertial and limited by internal and external pressures (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Internal
pressures include nontransferable personnel and investments in plant and equipment, while external pressures
include legal and fiscal entry and exit barriers, constraints on available information, and a need for legitimacy
within the organization’s domain. Conversely, strategic choice theorists argue that management’s chosen
strategies shape organizational outcomes (Andrews, 1971). Managers determine long-term goals and objectives
and implement courses of action (such as diversifying or discontinuing current activities) to pursue these goals
and objectives (Chandler, 1962). Decision makers (i.e., the dominant coalition) have a “strategic choice” to
implement structural change, determine the environmental domain in which to compete, and alter performance
standards (Child, 1972).
Hambrick and Finklestein’s (1987) managerial discretion model reconciles these conflicting views by recognizing
that many forces act on a continuum. A manager’s latitude of action can be constrained or enabled depending
on the degree to which each force exists. For example, CEOs with an internal locus of control pursue more
innovation and undertake greater risks, while CEOs with an external locus of control are more likely to follow
competitors (Miller, Kets De Vries, & Toulouse, 1982). Furthermore, strategic choice can be limited by inertial
forces and the need for incremental action and internal consistency (Mintzberg, 1978).
In their development of the managerial discretion construct, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) focus on three
forces that determine an executive’s latitude of action: the task environment, internal organizational factors,
and managerial characteristics. While all managers are decision makers and are influenced by such factors, a
substantial majority of empirical work to support and advance the concept of managerial discretion has been
focused on whether and how factors affect the CEO’s latitude of action. Before analyzing this research, we
briefly discuss the three managerial discretion forces and the factors within each force.

Task Environment

The task environment is characterized by factors in the organization’s domain (e.g., industry) and how the
organization functions within its domain. Since the task environment alters managerial discretion, managers
have substantially differing roles in affecting organizational performance across industries. The task
environment is expected to positively influence managerial discretion when product or service characteristics
vary greatly across industry competitors, the market for the industry’s products or services is growing, and
demand for the industry’s products or services is volatile. Conversely, the task environment may constrain
discretion when an industry is highly concentrated, highly regulated, and powerful external forces, such as

competitors, suppliers, and buyers, exist (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Porter,
1980; Thompson, 1967). Relatedly, Dess and Beard (1984) introduced munificence, dynamism, and complexity
as dimensions of the task environment relevant to industry firms. Many of the managerial discretion task
environment factors closely resemble these three dimensions (Boyd & Gove, 2006), and it is reasonable to
conclude that industry munificence, dynamism, and complexity all potentially increase a manager’s latitude of
action.

Internal Organization

Internal organizational factors influenced by inertial forces, powerful internal stakeholders, and resource
availability are the second force shaping discretion. The internal organization defines the degree to which the
organization is amenable to a variety of possible actions and subsequently empowers the CEO to execute those
actions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Inertial forces include an organization’s size, age, and culture.
Indeed, Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue that highly inertial organizations change their core features at a
much slower rate than environmental conditions in their domain change (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991). Thus, an
executive seeking to initiate change can be severely constrained by the ingrained culture of a larger or older
organization as a result of standardized routines or more formally defined roles and control systems (Hannan &
Freeman; Quinn & Cameron, 1983).
Relatedly, powerful internal stakeholders that are linked to the status quo may resist or even work against
change. Individuals and groups may derive power from their ability to cope with contingencies related to the
status quo and, thus, prioritize retaining the firm’s existing structure (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tushman &
Romanelli, 1985). Powerful stakeholders can perceive a potential loss of expert power and informational power
in the organization’s current strategy and domain (French & Raven, 1959) but also may perceive a loss of
legitimate, coercive, or referent power as a result of the executive’s impending actions (Boeker, 1997; Nutt,
1989).1
Capital intensity and resource availability can also constrain or enable a manager’s latitude of action.
Organizations that have made tremendous capital outlays are likely to be highly committed to their current
course of actions (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and potentially tied closely to their current products and processes
(Hambrick & Macmillan, 1985). Conversely, executives in organizations with abundant transferable resources
(e.g., cash reserves, unused debt capacity, and available managerial and technical talent) may pursue a broader
array of options (Cyert & March, 1963; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Firms such as Google, Microsoft, and Intel
currently have an abundance of available resources and are thus able to explore a wider range of strategic
options. However, despite these firms having abundant available resources, executives in these firms likely
confront bureaucracies and costs that constrain their discretion, illustrating the complex interaction of
organizational discretionary forces.

Managerial Characteristics and Psychological Microfoundations

A top manager’s psychological characteristics and their relationship with the firm can also limit or enhance the
degree to which the executive can envision and create multiple courses of action across various contexts
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). In advancing strategic choice theory, Child (1997) argued that executives in the
same environmental situation will set different levels of discretion for themselves on the basis of their
interpersonal linkage to the environment. A top manager’s tolerance for ambiguity, locus of control, and ability
to deal with cognitive complexity compose the psychology-based personal characteristics in this force.
Attributes of the top manager’s relationship with the firm, including his or her power base and commitment to
the status quo, are also included in defining personal characteristics affecting discretion.

The psychological microfoundations of managerial discretion are unique among the three factors influencing
latitude of action because they are not determined by external forces. As an example, let us consider locus of
control where the “external” person believes that events and outcomes are beyond their control and attributes
subsequent performance to luck or destiny (Rotter, 1966). In contrast, an “internal” person believes that events
and outcomes are primarily under his or her own control (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). While we might expect
that a CEO would always have an internal locus of control, multiple studies have found that this is not the
case. Miller et al. (1982) were among the first to link a CEO’s behavior to performance, finding that more
internal CEOs tended to pursue more innovation, take greater risks, and follow strategies different from industry
competitors. More recently, Carpenter and Golden (1997) found that top managers with an internal locus of
control had more discretion and that top managers who exhibited greater discretion were able to increase their
perceived power within the organization. Similar connections can be made between other psychological
constructs and managerial characteristics that influence managerial discretion (such as domain-specific selfefficacy and confidence). In short, executives’ characteristics will influence the degree to which they see the
need for action and take such action.
Having reviewed the foundational theories and concepts from Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) managerial
discretion model, we now provide a comprehensive review of empirical studies examining one or more forces in
the model.

Review of Managerial Discretion Research
Method

The objective of our review was to examine articles that operationalized managerial discretion in top
journals2 or other highly cited articles. We sought articles that were empirical in nature and specific to CEO or
TMT discretion. This review was limited to empirical studies to examine research designed to test the
managerial discretion construct.
Using Google Scholar, we searched specifically for the term “managerial discretion” or variants of the term, such
as “industry discretion,” in each top journal. We searched for the 100 most relevant articles from each top
journal that applied aspects of the Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) model or developed and examined
additional factors affecting discretion, such as isomorphic pressure (Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho, & Jackson, 2004)
and national culture (Crossland & Chen, 2013).3 This process yielded over 500 articles. To find highly cited
articles not in the top journals, we used Google Scholar to search specifically for the 100 most cited articles
citing Hambrick and Finkelstein. This process yielded an additional 21 articles.
All of the articles were then reviewed to determine whether they should be included in our literature review
tables. First, we found that the managerial discretion term has been used in many articles as a convenient
theoretical hook. Often managerial discretion is used as a passing term to justify why it is important to examine
top managers or firm actions without directly examining the sources, consequences, or moderating and
mediating effects of managerial discretion. Articles not really focused on managerial discretion were filtered out
because they did not operationalize the managerial discretion construct. Second, since our objective was to
include articles that were empirical in nature and specific to CEO or TMT discretion, we filtered out all articles
that did not operationalize managerial discretion. Third, each remaining article was then reviewed in detail to
determine whether the article substantially operationalized managerial discretion specific to the CEO or TMT,
with substantial operationalization defined as empirical studies focused solely on one or more aspects of the
managerial discretion construct, studies that operationalized two or more hypotheses developed from or prior
to Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), or studies that developed and examined additional factors affecting
discretion.4 This process yielded the 45 articles that are included in our literature review.

Our review and synthesis of the empirical research on managerial discretion suggested that each of the 45
studies identified that operationalize managerial discretion could be classified into one or more of three distinct
groups representing different approaches to modeling managerial discretion. Four articles modeled antecedents
of managerial discretion, 26 used measures of managerial discretion as independent variables to show the
consequences of managerial discretion, and 19 examined managerial discretion as a moderator or mediator
variable between other executive-controlled antecedents and firm-level outcomes.

Studies Examining the Antecedents of Managerial Discretion

Determining whether the expected aspects of the three forces truly yield discretion is vital to validating the
managerial discretion construct. Table 1 details the four studies that model managerial discretion as a
dependent variable. Two studies used survey measurements of perceived managerial discretion as an outcome
measure. In a food industry simulation, Carpenter and Golden (1997) surveyed master of business
administration students with 15 items on perceived discretion, finding an external locus of control to be
negatively related to perceived discretion, while Key (2002) surveyed managers in manufacturing and service
industry firms, finding that an external locus of control was associated with lower perceived discretion only in
low discretion situations. Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) measured discretion using a panel of academics and
analysts rating the level of managerial discretion in 17 industries. These discretion ratings were compared with
objective measures of the task environment leading to the finding that market growth, R&D intensity, and
advertising intensity were positively related and capital intensity was negatively related to discretion at the
industry level. Additionally, the authors did not find a relationship between two task environment factors
(demand instability and regulation) and discretion.

Table 1 Articles Examining Antecedents of Managerial Discretion
Managerial
Discretion
Force Used in
Study
Managerial
Characteristics

Author(s)

Task
Environment
and Internal
Organization

Hambrick &
Abrahamson
(1995)

Carpenter &
Golden
(1997)

Hambrick,
Finkelstein,
Cho &

Methods or
Measures Used
to Represent
Discretion
Food industry
simulation
executed with
MBA students
responding to
15 survey items
on perceived
managerial
discretion
Panel of
academics and
analysts rated
level of
discretion in 17
industries

Standard
deviation over
time of capital,

Independent
Variables

Key Findings

Locus of
control,
manager’s
perception of
discretion

A more external locus of control was associated
with managerial discretion perceptions in low
discretion situations. Individuals’ perceptions of
discretion tended to affect the power others
attributed to them only in situations where the
managers were purported to have little discretion.

Product
differentiability,
growth,
industry
structure,
demand
instability,
regulation,
power of
outside forces,
capital intensity
Six macrosocial
factors
characterizing

Three of six industry factors (R&D intensity,
advertising intensity, and market growth) were
positively related to discretion. Capital intensity
was negatively related to discretion. Two factors
(demand instability, regulation) were not related
to discretion.

Isomorphism (the need to be like other firms in
the industry) decreased over 40 years by finding
significant standard deviation increases for capital

Jackson
(2004)

Internal
Organization
and
Managerial
Characteristics

Key (2002)

advertising,
and R & D
intensity for
the industry by
year
Survey of
managers
focusing on
perceived
discretion
regarding
ethical
intentions of
other managers
in the firm

isomorphic
pressure by
year

intensity, advertising intensity, and R&D intensity.
Similar findings were noted for 18 additional
industries tested

Individual and
organizational
demographic
variables, loss
of control, firm
having an
ethical
organizational
culture

Manager’s external locus of control was negatively
related to perceived discretion. Presence of an
ethical culture was positively related to perceived
discretion. Individual and organizational
demographic variables did not predict perceived
discretion. Interaction of all independent variables
accounted for only 0.1% of additional variance of
perceived managerial discretion.

Note: MBA = master of business administration.
Hambrick et al. (2004) considered isomorphic pressure as an additional external factor, finding that decreased
isomorphism in the steel industry increased discretion. They replicated these findings for the 20 largest firms
from 18 additional industries.
Figure 1 summarizes findings of research on managerial discretion’s antecedents. Given the small number of
studies, it is not surprising that many of the factors in task environment and internal organization have not been
studied or, in the cases of demand instability, regulation, and firm size, no support was found from a single
study. Additionally, many psychological factors (including ambiguity tolerance, cognitive complexity, and
aspiration level) and the manager’s power base and political acumen have yet to be empirically examined.
Furthermore, it is apparent that researchers have struggled to measure discretion. Two articles used survey
methods to measure perceived managerial discretion, one article (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995) used a panel
of academics and analysts to measure discretion at the industry level, and one article (Hambrick et al., 2004)
measured discretion using industry task environment factors to build a composite measure of industry-level
managerial discretion. In short, limited research has focused on examining the antecedents and measurement of
the managerial discretion construct.

Figure 1 Summary of Results of the Antecedents of Managerial Discretion
Note: Factors in bold have been found to significantly affect managerial discretion; underlined factors have been
empirically tested but no significant support has been found; italicized factors have not been empirically tested
with managerial discretion as a dependent variable. Plus and minus signs indicate factors increasing and
decreasing managerial discretion, respectively. Adapted from Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) and Finkelstein,
Hambrick, and Cannella (2009).

Studies Examining Consequences of Managerial Discretion

If leaders do indeed matter, then the discretion held by CEO and TMT members should affect performance and
organizational effectiveness. Table 2 provides a summary of articles examining the consequences of managerial
discretion, while Figure 2 illustrates how studies have examined managerial discretion’s influence on various
outcomes. We identified 25 studies that used managerial discretion as an independent variable and that utilized
measures from the task environment, internal organization, or managerial characteristics to assess the effects of
discretion. Of the 25 studies identified, 3 studies examined task environment and internal organization within
the same study, while 1 study examined both task environment and managerial characteristics. Finally, 4 studies
addressed an additional force and its effect on firm-level outcomes: the institutional environment, emphasizing
how nationality-based factors enable or constrain managers.

Table 2 Articles Examining the Consequences of Managerial Discretion
Managerial
Discretion
Force Used in
Study
Task
Environment

Author(s)

Abrahamson
& Hambrick
(1997)

Method for
Measuring
Managerial
Discretion
Panel of
academics and
analysts rated 14
industries

Dependent Variables

Key Findings

Attentional
homogeneity (from
content analysis)

There are significant negative
correlations between industry discretion
and lexical commonality and lexical
density measures of attention
homogeneity. Industries with less

Datta &
Rajagopalan
(1998)

Industry capital
intensity and
growth, product
differentiation

Organizational tenure,
executive age,
education level,
throughput functional
background, firm
performance

Finkelstein
& Boyd
(1998)

Growth, R&D,
advertising and
capital intensity,
demand
instability,
concentration,
regulation
Growth, R&D,
advertising and
capital intensity,
demand
instability,
concentration,
regulation

CEO compensation

Finkelstein
(2009)

Graffin,
Carpenter,
& Boivie
(2011)
Hambrick &
Quigley
(2014)

Keegan &
Kabanoff
(2008)

Peteraf &
Reed (2007)

Growth, R&D,
advertising and
capital intensity,
demand
instability
Discretion ratings
for each industry
using Hambrick
and Abrahamson
(1995)

Attentional
homogeneity
(using lexical
commonality and
density) used as
proxy for
industry-level
discretion
Data on airline
cost function

CEO compensation,
performancecontingent
compensation

Likelihood of a “noisy”
CEO succession
CEO effect on variance
in ROA on the basis of
new method

Debt usage, significant
account adjustments,
disciplining effect of
debt

Cost function of various
airlinespecific factors

discretion have more attentional
homogeneity among different firms’ top
managers.
Advertising intensity was negatively
related with organizational tenure and
throughput background and positively
related to education level. Industry
growth rate was negatively related with
organizational tenure and age. Industry
capital intensity was shown to have a
weak relationship with throughput
background. Firms with greater
postsuccession performance
improvements appeared to match CEO
successor characteristics more closely to
industry conditions.
Managerial discretion is positively
related to CEO compensation. This
relationship was shown to be much
stronger for high performers versus low
performers.
Discretion was modeled as a construct
using the independent variables as
indicators. For both compensation
dependent variables, discretion was
significantly related to compensation.
Concentration and demand instability
were the only two factors not
significantly related to discretion.
Firm-related managerial discretion was
not significantly related to the likelihood
of a noisy CEO succession event.
Stronger CEO effect was shown overall
and for low, medium, and high industry
discretion subsamples using the CEO in
context method. CEO in context method
points to a much greater aggregate CEO
effect. Effects are strongest for CEOs in
high discretion industries and stronger in
medium discretion industries than in low
discretion industries.
Industry-level discretion was negatively
associated with industry debt usage.
Firms in high discretion industries
perform significant account adjustments
more than firms in low discretion
industries. When industry-level
discretion is high, debt’s disciplining
effects within an industry decrease.
Managerial behavior changed when
regulations were lifted; managers

separated into
regulated and
deregulated
periods

Sahaym,
Treviño, &
Steensma
(2012)

Internal
Organization

Composite
industry measure
of task
environment
variables: growth,
product
differentiation,
capital intensity,
structure
Strategic
orientation from
interviews and
archival sources

Industry exports
measured as export
intensity

Kim (2013)

CEO duality;
percent of inside
directors

Entry by an
independent power
producer into the
renewable generation
market

Quigley &
Hambrick
(2012)

Each firm-year
can be low
discretion
(predecessor CEO
as board chair) or
higher discretion
(departure of CEO
as board chair)

Strategic change; firm
performance

Roth &
O’Donnell
(1996)

Lateral
centralization:
directly stated to

Subsidiary senior
management pay mix,
competitive positioning

Boyd &
Salamin
(2001)

Compensation plan

choose more efficient strategies without
regulation. Regulation restricted
managerial choice of network structure
in the presence of economies of network
density and forced executives to choose
strategies that had wasteful levels of
quality in the form of costly meals and
amenities.
Higher managerial discretion leads to
greater industry exports. When
innovations or uncertainty are high, the
effect of managerial discretion on
industry exports is stronger. The
relationship between managerial
discretion and exports are weakest for
industries where levels of innovation
and uncertainty are low.
Strategic orientation affects the pay of
all employees, not just top managers.
Base pay is higher with change-oriented
strategies. Bonus pay and bonus pay–to–
base pay ratio are also higher with
changed-oriented strategies but only at
upper levels of hierarchy.
Weak support for CEO duality increasing
likelihood of market entry. CEO duality
(greater discretion) with a higher
presence of independent power
producers in the market significantly
increases the likelihood of market entry.
Percent of inside directors (alone or with
a higher presence of independent power
producers) did not significantly affect
the likelihood of market entry.
Predecessor retention suppresses
strategic change, which leads to
diminished performance changes. When
the predecessor CEO leaves as board
chair, strategic change increases,
resulting in greater performance
changes. Predecessor retention as chair
was significantly negatively related to
resource reallocation, divestitures, and
TMT departures. The 1st year that the
successor CEO is free of the predecessor
is positively related to resource
reallocation, divestitures, and TMT
turnover. Performance tends to be in
line with presuccession performance
when the predecessor is board chair, but
there are large changes in performance
once the predecessor departs.
Subsidiaries with increasing degrees of
lateral decentralization (greater
discretion) have higher levels of

increase
managerial
discretion of
subsidiary
management
Nonmanagementowned stock
constraining
management’s
ability to
influence a board
Firm ownership
structure;
management
controlled
(highest
discretion
structure),
designated for
firms not having
greater than 5%
ownership by an
individual or
organization

of executives’ pay,
salary adjustment
criteria

McClelland,
Liang, &
Barker
(2010)

Dummy variables
for low and high
discretion;
groupings
selected based on
previous research
and validated
using R&D,
advertising and
capital intensity,
growth

CEO CSQ; future firm
performance

Miller, Kets
De Vries, &
Toulouse
(1982)

Via interview to
obtain a locus of
control score for
CEO (24 of 33
firms) and TMT
(all 33 firms)

Aggregate innovation,
risk taking,
proactiveness, and
planning horizon all via
interview

Singh &
Harianto
(1989)

Werner &
Tosi (1995)

Managerial
Characteristics

Likelihood of adopting
a golden parachute

Pay-level policy, pay
differentiation

incentive-based compensation or a
greater mix of senior management pay.
Market positioning of subsidiary’s
executives’ salaries is positively related
to lateral decentralization.
Higher concentration of stock ownership
in nonmanagement hands (decreased
discretion) reduces the likelihood that a
board adopts a golden parachute.
Base pay and bonus of managers in
owner-controlled and ownermanaged
firms (lower discretion) was significantly
lower than in management-controlled
firms. Change in performance was
related to the change in base salary and
bonus for ownercontrolled firms but not
for management-controlled firms.
Change in size was not significantly
related to change in base and bonus for
any organizational structure.
Managementcontrolled firms made
greater use of long-term incentives.
Owner-managed firms have significantly
greater percentages of bonus-eligible
employees than management-controlled
firms. Management-controlled firms had
significantly higher bonus pay–to–base
pay ratio and bonus pay than
ownercontrolled or owner-managed
firms.
CEO CSQ associated with industry-level
managerial discretion but only in low
discretion industries. CEO CSQ
associated with lower future accounting
performance in high discretion
industries. No support found for lower
industry discretion moderating the
relationship between CEO CSQ and
accounting performance. For market
performance (Tobin’s Q), CEO CSQ in low
discretion industries has a positive
moderating effect, while CEO CSQ in
high discretion industries has a negative
moderating effect.
Innovation, risk taking, proactiveness,
and planning horizon in all firms were
significantly correlated to an internal
locus of control (greater discretion).
Innovation and internal locus of control
were not significantly correlated for
lower tenure executives. For executives
in small firms, locus of control was
significantly correlated with innovation,

Task
Environment
and
Managerial
Characteristics

Task
Environment
and Internal
Organization

Roth (1992)

Decision-making
factors; risk
taking; openness

ROA and sales growth

Adams,
Almeida, &
Ferreira
(2005)

CEO power to
influence
decisions via
three dummy
measures;
industry
discretion via
Hambrick and
Abrahamson
(1995)

Variability of stock
returns, Tobin’s Q, and
ROA for 1992 to 1999

Firms’ innovation
position in industry

Rajagopalan
&
Finkelstein
(1992)

Environmental
dynamism via
CEO/TMT survey
responses on
frequency of
environmental
changes; firm size
Strategic
orientation via
CEO survey:
innovation,
efficiency,
domain
expansion;
uncertainty
deemed lower
prior to 1978 and
higher after 1983

Wasserman,
Anand, &
Nohria
(2010)

Opportunity
scarcity; industry
growth; resource
availability

CEO effect based on
Tobin’s Q

Papadakis &
Bourantas
(1998)

CEO compensation,
CEO salary, CEO annual
bonus, and average
executive team cash
compensation

risk taking, proactiveness, and having a
planning horizon. However, executives’
locus of control was significantly
correlated only with proactiveness in
large firms.
Risk-taking behavior by TMT members
significantly related to ROA more in a
multidomestic strategy than a global
strategy. No support for openness in
decision making having a greater impact
on firm performance between business
units following a multidomestic strategy
versus a global strategy.
Retention of the CEO title by one of the
founders is the most consistent variable
affecting performance variability, but
there is some evidence that the other
two measures of CEO power (CEO’s
concentration of titles and CEO as the
only board insider) are positively related
to performance variability. All three
measures of CEO power have a stronger
positive effect on performance
variability in high discretion industries.
Environmental dynamism significantly
related to major product innovation.
Both environmental dynamism and firm
size related to incremental product
innovation.
Prospector firms, presumed to have the
highest discretion, had higher executive
pay. Defenders have higher overall
executive pay than reactors. Prospectors
have higher outcome-based
compensation than other typologies and
have a greater proportion of
compensation based on outcomes.
During periods of uncertainty,
executives have higher overall
compensation, more outcome-based
compensation, and a higher proportion
of cash compensation based on
outcomes.
In industries more highly concentrated
or constrained by external relationships,
companies have fewer opportunities to
act and, thus, the CEO impact is larger.
When industry growth is low,
opportunities are scarce and the CEO
effect is high. CEOs have less impact on
performance when opportunities are
plentiful and when debt levels and
servicing requirements are high. When

Institutional
Environment

Crossland &
Hambrick
(2007)

Three countries
classified using
Hofstede’s
typology
emphasizing
individualism
versus
collectivism and
uncertainty
avoidance

Firm performance via
ROA, ROS, sales
growth, market to book

Crossland &
Hambrick
(2011)

Country-level
rating of
managerial
discretion via
surveys from
expert panel

Firm performance via
ROA, ROIC, ROS, MTB

Gedajlovic &
Shapiro
(1998)

Ownership
concentration;
nationality-based
constraints

Firm profitability

Makhija &
Stewart
(2002)

Survey results
from four
questions on
perceptions of
government
control;
discretion
deemed low for
United States and
high for Czech
Republic

Organizational
accountability;
decision-making
orientation

slack is high, CEOs can proactively take
advantage of opportunities that may
change company performance.
Performance variance explained by the
CEO was consistently greater in the U.S.
sample than in the German or Japanese
samples. Countries with lower
constraints, presumed to impart greater
discretion upon executives, increase the
CEO’s effect on firm performance
outcomes.

National-level of discretion was a
significant predictor of national-level
CEO effects (i.e., the amount of variance
in firm performance attributable to CEOlevel factors), suggesting that nations
with a greater level of discretion have
firms with greater CEO effects.
For U.S. and German firms, typified by
external constraints, ownership
concentration was related to
profitability. In France (typified by
internal constraints), United Kingdom
(typified by external constraints), and
Canada (typified by both internal and
external constraints), no relationship
was found between ownership
concentration and profitability
Managers in more free market–oriented
countries perceive more outcome
accountability, are more comfortable
with uncertainty, and have a stronger
sense of power over decision outcomes
than managers in planned institutional
environments. A decision-making
orientation that reflects a greater
comfort with uncertainty and a sense of
power over decision outcomes leads to
greater risk taking, while greater
perceived organizational accountability
leads to less risk taking.

Note: ROA = return on assets; TMT = top management team; CSQ = commitment to the status quo; ROS = return
on sales; ROIC = return on invested capital; MTB = manage to budget.

Figure 2 Summary of the Consequences of Managerial Discretion
Note: Plus and minus signs indicate outcomes increased and decreased by managerial discretion, respectively.
The managerial discretion model argues that when a CEO’s ability to influence decisions is high, his or her effect
on firm-level outcomes is greater. Several studies find support for this notion. For instance, Hambrick and
Quigley (2014) devise a new method to predict CEO effects on firm performance and divide their sample into
high, medium, and low discretion industries. The authors find that in industries with greater discretion, CEOs
have a greater effect on performance, with their “CEO in context” method pointing to a much greater aggregate
CEO effect than shown previously. These results are consistent with prior studies examining the relationship
between discretion from CEO power and performance variability, finding that discretion from CEO power is
positively related to performance variability (e.g., Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005). Using nation-level
measures of discretion, Crossland and Hambrick (2007) find that CEOs in countries with fewer institutional
constraints have a greater effect on firm performance. In a follow-up study, the authors find that national-level
discretion is a predictor of national-level CEO effects, whereby nations with greater discretion have greater CEO
effects (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). Alternatively, Wasserman, Anand, and Nohria (2010) find that a scarcity of
opportunities to act, due to high industry concentration or low industry growth, increases a CEO’s effect on
Tobin’s Q. In short, studies provide greater support for the notion that discretion increases CEO effects on firm
performance; however, this may be based on how the level of discretion is measured. Despite these findings,
only one study has explored how managerial characteristics influence CEO effects on firm performance.

The second most commonly studied outcome of managerial discretion is compensation. Using a variety of task
environment factors as proxies for discretion, studies show that higher discretion yields greater CEO
compensation (Finkelstein, 2009; Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992), and such effects are stronger for high
performing CEOs (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). Examining internal factors, Roth and O’Donnell (1996) find that
decentralized foreign subsidiaries have a higher degree of incentive pay, while Werner and Tosi (1995) find that
owner-controlled and owner-managed firms have lower base and bonus pay for executives. Finally, a firm’s
strategic orientation has been shown to affect the pay of all employees, as firms with change-oriented strategies
have higher base and bonus pay (Boyd & Salamin, 2001). These findings are significant, as greater discretion
indicates a need for a higher quality manager to choose proper strategic choices, increasing the level of
compensation that executives receive.
A third important set of outcomes examined relates to firm strategic behavior. In an early study, Miller and
colleagues (1982) find that innovation, risk taking, proactiveness, and planning horizon were all correlated to an
internal locus of control, a managerial characteristic that increases discretion. Kim (2013) finds that CEO duality,
a measure of CEO power that increases discretion, increases the likelihood of market entry. McClelland, Liang,
and Barker (2010) find that discretion significantly influences a CEO’s commitment to the status quo. Industry
factors (low discretion industries), internal factors (smaller organizations), and managerial demographics (older
executives) all lead to greater commitment to the status quo. Examining an institutional measure of
discretion, Makhija and Stewart (2002) find that managers in free market–oriented countries engage in greater
risk taking. Consistent with these studies, results from Quigley and Hambrick (2012) show that an internal factor
relating to a powerful force, the retention of a prior CEO on the board, limits the amount of strategic change
that happens under a new CEO. The retention of the predecessor as board chair results in less resource
reallocation, fewer divestitures, and fewer TMT departures, suggesting that allowing a prior CEO to remain as
board chair significantly decreases the discretion of a new CEO. In short, findings suggest that proxies for
discretion are related to the level of organizational risk taking, innovation, and strategic change.
Our review of the literature on the consequences of discretion suggests that the four factors of discretion tested
strongly relate to CEO effects on performance outcomes, the level and mix of CEO compensation, and firm
strategic behavior. Despite these studies, only a small number of studies examine alternative consequences,
such as level of debt usage (Keegan & Kabanoff, 2008), corporate governance (Singh & Harianto, 1989), industry
attention patterns (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997), CEO characteristics (Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998), and
efficiency of organizational strategies (Peteraf & Reed, 2007). Future research could focus on new, significant
organizational decisions likely to be affected by the level of discretion.
We also found that over half of the 25 studies examining discretion’s consequences used archival data to
measure discretion. Nine of these studies used a combination of measures from the Hambrick and Finkelstein
(1987) task environment force. With a small set of studies using other measurement methodologies, such as
attentional homogeneity via content analysis (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997) or industry changes from a
deregulating event (Peteraf & Reed, 2007), a reasonably robust set of measures exists for the task environment
force. However, all but 2 studies examining the consequences of managerial discretion from organizational
forces use archival data to measure discretion. This has limited our understanding of how organizational forces
of discretion affect outcomes since only readily available factors (e.g., CEO duality) have been examined.
Challenges associated with using nonarchival methods also seem to have limited the study of the consequences
of an executive’s psychological traits, as only 4 of the 25 studies have measured managerial discretion using
executives’ psychological traits. Future research using alternative methods (e.g., surveys, interviews, and
content analysis) would greatly enhance our understanding of how organizational culture and powerful inside
forces may constrain an executive and our understanding of the consequences of discretion.

Studies Examining Managerial Discretion as a Mediator or Moderator

While discretion is theorized to directly affect a number of outcomes, many studies have focused on discretion
as an important moderator or mediator between strategy variables and firm outcomes. Table 3presents the 19
studies we have identified that utilize managerial discretion as either a moderator or mediator, while Figure
3 pictorially identifies how studies have theorized that discretion may mediate or moderate important
outcomes. Within these 19 studies, only 4 have utilized managerial discretion as a mediating variable, while the
other 15 have used discretion as a moderator.

Table 3 Articles Using Managerial Discretion as a Mediator or Moderator
Managerial
Discretion
Force Used
in Study
Task
Environme
nt

Author(s)

Datta,
Guthrie,
& Wright
(2005)

Goll,
Johnson,
&
Rasheed
(2008)

Haleblian
&
Finkelstei
n (1993)

Hambric
k,
Geletkan
ycz, &
Fredricks

Managerial
Discretion and
Measure
Usage
Moderator:
industry
capital
intensity,
growth,
product
differentiation
, dynamism
Moderator:
airline
prederegulatio
n and
postderegulati
on

Independ
ent
Variables

Dependent
Variables

Key Findings

HPWS

Labor
productivity
(log of firm
sales to total
employees)

Industry capital intensity, growth, and product
differentiation all found to positively strengthen
the relationship between HPWS and labor
productivity. No significant effect was found for
industry dynamism as a moderator between
HPWS and labor productivity.

TMT age,
tenure,
educatio
n level,
functiona
l
diversity

Business
strategy
(differentiati
on, cost
leader,
breadth of
strategic
scope)

Moderator:
industry’s
average
advertising
and R&D
intensity and
annual sales
growth;
standard
deviation of
annual sales
growth;
degree of
regulation
Moderator:
three high
discretion and
three low
discretion
industries

TMT size,
CEO
dominan
ce

Firm
performanc
e

Environment exerts a moderating influence on
the TMT demographics-strategy relationship in
the deregulated industry but not the regulated
industry. Younger and less tenured managers
place marginally greater emphasis on
differentiation during deregulation but also
emphasize a low-cost strategy. Better educated
executives place more emphasis on
differentiation in the deregulated environment.
TMTs with greater functional diversity emphasize
low-cost strategies in deregulated environments.
Team size and CEO dominance significantly
related to firm performance when discretion in
the task environment is high but not when
discretion is low.

Organiza
tional
performa
nce,
organizat
ion and

CSQ
measured
using
executive
surveys

Strong current performance was positively
related to CSQ for leadership and strategy.
Executives in high discretion situations, but not
those in low discretion situations, interpret poor
performance as a signal that an organization
needs to change. Current performance and CSQ

on
(1993)
Lieberso
n&
O’Conno
r (1972)

Magnan
& St.
Onge
(1997)

Messers
mith,
Lee,
Guthrie,
& Li
(2013)
Internal
Organizatio
n

J. T.
Campbell
,
Campbell
, Sirmon,
Bierman,
& Tuggle
(2012)
Preston,
Chen, &
Leidner
(2008)

Quigley
&
Hambric
k (2012)

Moderator:
variance
explained by
administration
after year and
company
effects are
removed
Moderator:
sum of five
binary
variables for
distinct
dimensions of
discretion
Moderator:
industry
instability;
industry
munificence
and
complexity
Moderator:
spline function
used to
classify firms
between low
and high
discretion
based on net
PP&E/
employees
Mediator: CIO
and other TMT
member
responses on
CIO strategic
decisionmaking
authority

Mediator:
each year can
be low
discretion
(predecessor

industry
tenure
Year
effect,
industry
effect,
company
effect,
administr
ation
effect
Bank
performa
nce:
ROA,
stock
market
return
TMT
turnover

Sales, net
earnings,
profit
margin

are more strongly related in high discretion
industries than in low discretion industries.
Administrative effect on sales varies only on the
degree of industry concentration. Profit margins
affected by management when: industries have
low labor intensity or where worker pay is a
smaller part of total employment costs, industry
is growing, advertising is important, consumers
form a sizable market, TMT is larger

Total CEO
compensati
on

Managerial discretion positively influences the
strength of the relationship between bank
performance and executive compensation. Each
individual dimension of managerial discretion
moderates the relationship between bank
performance and executive compensation.

Firm
performanc
e

Industry sales growth positively moderated the
relationship between TMT turnover and firm
performance, contrary to predictions. No
significant moderating effects from industry
complexity or instability were found.

CEO
discretio
n

Shareholder
value
change on
the day of
the
announcem
ent of a new
SEC proxy
access rule

Abnormal shareholder returns from the
announcement of a new SEC proxy access rule
were positive and significant for low and high
discretion but significantly larger for firms in high
discretion industries.

Organiza
tional
decisionmaking
climate,
support
for IT;
CIO
effective
ness,
structura
l power;
CIO/TMT
partners
hip
Predeces
sor CEO
retained,
1st free
year

IT
contribution
via survey
responses
from TMT
members

CIO strategic decision-making authority found to
significantly mediate the relationship between
organizational climate, organizational support
for IT, CIO structural power, CIO strategic
effectiveness, and CIO’s partnership with other
TMT members and IT’s contribution to firm
performance.

Strategic
change; firm
performanc
e

Predecessor retention suppresses strategic
change, leading to diminished performance
changes. When the predecessor CEO leaves as
board chair, strategic change increases, resulting
in greater performance changes. Predecessor

CEO as board
chair) or
higher
discretion
(departure of
CEO as board
chair)

Managerial
Characteris
tics

Rajagopa
lan
(1997)

Moderator:
survey of
senior
executives on
strategic
orientation

Buchholt
z,
Amason,
&
Rutherfo
rd (1999)

Mediator:
survey
response from
CEOs on
discretion for
decisions
regarding
charitable
contributions;
validated
discretion
versus 14
other business
discretion
items
Moderator:
MBA student
survey
responses on
tolerance for
ambiguity and
locus of
control
Moderator:
intraindustry
and
extraindustry
ties

Dollinger
, Golden,
& Saxton
(1997)

Geletkan
ycz &
Hambric
k (1997)

retention as chair was significantly negatively
related to resource reallocation, divestitures,
and TMT departures. The 1st year that the
successor CEO is “free” of the predecessor is
positively related to resource reallocation,
divestitures, and TMT turnover. Performance
tends to be in line with presuccession
performance when the predecessor is board
chair, but large changes in performance occur
once the predecessor departs.
Strong support for incentive plans including cash
and stock rewards associated with better firm
performance for prospectors. Most annual
bonus or long-term plans did not show
association with better firm performance for
defenders.

Annual
bonus
plan,
longterm
performa
nce plan,
stock
option
plan
Firm
resource
s via
survey
validated
using
financial
performa
nce from
archival
data

Return on
capital,
stock price
return

Corporate
philanthrop
y measured
via survey
responses

Availability of firm resources significantly affects
the amount of corporate philanthropy. When
managerial discretion related to charitable
contributions was added, the results supported
full mediation of firm resources and corporate
philanthropy by managerial discretion. When the
TMT’s values related to charitable contributions
was added, the effect of managerial values was
shown to be moderately significant while the
effect of managerial discretion was no longer
significant, supporting partial mediation of
managerial discretion and corporate
philanthropy by the values of the TMT.

Firm
reputatio
n

Approval of
alliance with
competitor
or supplier

Individuals with high tolerance ambiguity or with
internal locus of control were more likely to
suppress both the most positive and most
negative reputation information in alliance
decision.

Absolute
differenc
es of
strategic
indicator
s for
each firm
versus
industry
means

ROA, ROS

Weak support for moderating effects of hiring
executives in the same industry and no support
for trade association ties as a moderator
between strategic indicators and firm
performance. Hiring executives from outside the
firm’s industry and TMTs serving on other firms’
boards found to moderate the relationship
between strategy and firm performance.
Directors outside the firm’s industry had an
unexpected negative moderating effect on firm
performance. No significant moderating effect
found from professional association ties.

Task
Environme
nt and
Internal
Organizatio
n

Finkelstei
n&
Hambric
k (1990)

Moderator:
three sample
industries
(high,
medium, low)

Task
Environme
nt and
Managerial
Characteris
tics

Adams,
Almeida,
&
Ferreira
(2005)

Moderator:
CEO power to
influence
decisions;
industry
discretion via
Hambrick and
Abrahamson
(1995)
Moderator:
dummy
variables for
low and high
discretion;
groupings
selected on
the basis of
previous
research and
validated
using R&D,
advertising
and capital
intensity, sales
growth
Moderator:
country-level
rating of
managerial
discretion via
surveys from
expert panel
of analysts

McClella
nd,
Liang, &
Barker
(2010)

Institutiona
l
Environme
nt

Crosslan
d & Chen
(2013)

Crosslan
d&
Hambric
k (2011)

Moderator:
country-level
rating of
managerial
discretion via
surveys from
expert panel

TMT
member
tenure,
firm size,
immedia
te slack,
firm
performa
nce
CEO
power to
influence
decisions

Strategic
persistence
and
conformity;
performanc
e conformity

Member
ship in a
low or
high
discretio
n
industry;
CEO CSQ
via
content
analysis
of CEO
letters

CEO CSQ;
future firm
performanc
e

CEO CSQ associated with industry-level
managerial discretion but only in low discretion
industries. CEO CSQ is significantly associated
with lower future accounting performance in
high discretion industries. No support found for
lower industry discretion moderating the
relationship between CEO CSQ and accounting
performance. For market performance (Tobin’s
Q), CEO CSQ in low discretion industries has a
positive moderating effect, while CEO CSQ in
high discretion industries has a negative
moderating effect.

Firm
performa
nce

CEO
dismissal/
succession

Individua
lism;
uncertai
nty
tolerance
; power
distance;
cultural
loosenes
s;
ownershi

Firm
performanc
e

For the six countries used in this study, the
probability of dismissal due to poor performance
varied for the six countries. Probability of
dismissal due to poor performance was highest
in the United States, followed (in order) by
Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and
Japan. When the six countries are aggregated,
the probability of dismissal when performance is
poor is significantly higher when managerial
discretion is high.
Discretion fully mediated the relationship
between uncertainty tolerance and CEO
effectiveness. The effects of individualism,
cultural looseness, ownership dispersion, and
legal origin on CEO effectiveness were partially
mediated by discretion. National level of
discretion was a significant predictor of nationallevel CEO effects, suggesting that nations with a
greater level of discretion have firms with
greater CEO effects.

Variability of
stock
returns,
Tobin’s Q,
and ROA

The associations between team tenure and
strategic conformity and persistence are
stronger in the high discretion computer industry
than in the medium and low discretion
industries. The association between team tenure
and performance conformity was significantly
positive for the high discretion industry but
significantly negative for the medium discretion
industry.
CEO title retention by one of the founders is the
most consistent variable affecting performance
variability, but there is some evidence that CEO’s
concentration of titles and CEO as the only board
insider are also positively related to performance
variability. All three measures of CEO power
have a stronger positive effect on performance
variability in high discretion industries.

p
dispersio
n; legal
origin;
employe
r
flexibility

Note: HPWS = high performance work system; TMT = top management team; CSQ = commitment to status quo;
ROA = return on assets; PP&E = property, plant, and equipment; SEC = Securities and Exchange Commission; CIO
= chief information officer; IT = information technology; MBA = master in business administration; ROS = return
on sales.

Figure 3 Summary of Managerial Discretion as a Mediator or Moderator
Note: Factors in bold have been found to significantly support moderating or mediating effects; underlined
factors have been empirically tested but no significant support has been found; italicized factors have not been
empirically tested as moderators. Independent and dependent variables shown are those used in empirical
studies where significant moderating or mediating effects were supported. Plus and minus signs indicate factors
acting as positive and negative moderators, respectively. Moderating factors adapted from Hambrick and
Finkelstein (1987) and Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009).

Discretion as a moderator

Studies utilizing managerial discretion as a moderator have examined a number of important outcomes largely
related to firm performance and strategic changes. With regards to strategy, Finkelstein and Hambrick
(1990) find that TMT tenure is associated with strategic conformity and persistence; however, these
relationships were stronger in a higher discretion industry than in a lower discretion industry, suggesting that
high discretion industries enable TMTs to have a greater influence on strategy. Similar findings are echoed
by Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson (1993), who find that strong performance leads to a management
commitment to the status quo in high discretion industries. Relatedly, Goll, Johnson, and Rasheed (2008)found
that the association of TMT demographics and the type of strategy firms pursued was contingent upon a firm

being in a high discretion industry. The authors note that in deregulated environments, younger and less
tenured managers and TMTs with greater functional diversity emphasized a low-cost strategy during
deregulation, while better educated executives emphasized pursuing a differentiation strategy in the
deregulated industry.
Discretion can also influence the relationship between management characteristics (or strategy) and firm
performance. For instance, Adams et al. (2005), using Hambrick and Abrahamson’s (1995) industry measures,
found that discretion from CEO power has a greater effect on firm performance variability in industries with
greater discretion. Furthermore, a CEO’s commitment to the status quo is associated with lower accounting firm
performance only in high discretion industries (McClelland et al., 2010). Similar results hold for market
performance in a high discretion industry; however, a CEO’s commitment to the status quo combined with low
discretion industries positively enhances market performance. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) find that CEO
dominance and team size were related to firm performance only when discretion was high, while Messersmith,
Lee, Guthrie, and Li (2013) found a significant relationship between TMT turnover and firm performance as
moderated by industry growth rate.
Researchers also illustrate discretion’s moderating effects on CEO dismissal (Crossland & Chen, 2013), CEO
compensation (Magnan & St. Onge, 1997), and abnormal shareholder returns (J. T. Campbell et al., 2012). One
interesting study by Datta, Guthrie, and Wright (2005) found that three task environment factors positively
strengthened the relationship between high performance work systems and labor productivity, suggesting that
high performance work systems more strongly influence productivity in high discretion industries. These studies
suggest that discretion influences firm-level outcomes and strategic decision making. Future research should
continue to use discretion as a contingency moderator to examine factors that enable or constrain strategic
decision making and how such factors influence firm outcomes. Furthermore, the majority of research
employing discretion as a moderator has examined it using task environment factors, rather than exploring
managerial characteristics or internal organization factors.

Discretion as a mediator

A relative paucity of work has attempted to use discretion as a mediator. Despite this, the research that has
employed measures of discretion as a mediator has identified fruitful findings. Preston, Chen, and Leidner
(2008) examined chief information officer (CIO) decision-making authority as a measure of discretion, finding
that CIO decision-making authority mediated the relationship between four measures of the organizational
environment and information technology’s ability to contribute to firm performance. Buchholtz, Amason, and
Rutherford (1999) examine the effect of resources as a factor in corporate philanthropy. Managerial discretion
was found to fully mediate the relationship between firm resources and corporate philanthropy, with the
relationship between managerial discretion and corporate philanthropy partially mediated by the values of the
TMT. Finally, Crossland and Hambrick (2011) find that managerial discretion, measured via country-level ratings
by an expert panel of academics and analysts, mediates the effects of uncertainty tolerance, individualism,
cultural looseness, ownership dispersion, and legal origin on CEO effectiveness.
In sum, research to date has begun to explore questions of how managerial discretion affects a wide variety of
outcomes and what contributes to discretion. Despite this, many gaps remain, given the limited number of
studies that measure discretion directly. Similar to methodologies employed in examining managerial
discretion’s consequences, well over half of the studies applying discretion as a moderator or mediator use
archival data as a proxy for discretion. Thus, our understanding of how the relationships between executive,
firm, and industry antecedents and outcomes (e.g., firm performance, executive compensation, and strategy
change) are affected by organizational culture and other inertial forces and a manager’s psychological traits is
very limited. Additionally, only a limited number of studies attempt to examine firm-level decisions affected by

discretion, and the role that discretion can play in enhancing the effectiveness of certain actions in certain
environments.

Future Managerial Discretion Research Opportunities
Our review illustrates that since Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) formally introduced the concept of managerial
discretion, a number of studies have attempted to examine the antecedents and consequences of managerial
latitude of action. Despite these studies, however, significant opportunities still exist for researchers to explore
how managerial discretion is influenced by a variety of forces, as well as how such forces influence many
organizational outcomes, both individually and in combination. In this section, we examine some of the
empirical gaps that remain and describe important questions and areas for future research.

Improving Measures of Managerial Discretion

We see an excessive reliance on archival data in measuring managerial discretion. While there are substantial
challenges associated with surveys and interviews of senior executives, and content analysis of annual reports
and correspondence with the media, it seems unlikely that we can develop support for many of the human
factors that affect discretion without such efforts. Thus, we encourage researchers to devote their creative
energy towards methods that will give us a more complete assessment of the managerial discretion construct.
Relatedly, we also encourage researchers to seek discretion measures that discriminate the construct from its
closely related psychological (e.g., locus of control), organizational (e.g., inertia), and environmental (e.g.,
market growth) antecedents.5 Additionally, we call for future research to develop composite measures of
discretion. We encourage developing composite measures that appropriately weight the various factors within
the internal organization and managerial characteristics forces. Such a composite measure will likely need to use
a mix of archival data and data derived from nonarchival methods, but we would encourage researchers to seek
to validate all measures and weightings using a variety of methods. Using more sophisticated modeling
techniques may allow researchers to create latent constructs related to each discretion force and ultimately an
overall construct based on discretion forces identified in research, furthering validation of the construct.

Assessing Managerial Discretion’s Construct Validity

Despite the many studies that rely upon the managerial discretion construct, we identified only four studies that
measure discretion as a dependent variable as well as a handful of other studies that use direct measures of
managerial discretion. These studies have enhanced our knowledge of what yields discretion, providing support
for measures such as locus of control and industry R&D and advertising intensity increasing managerial
perceptions of discretion. Despite these findings, many of the original concepts proposed by Hambrick and
Finkelstein (1987) remain untested. Many studies reviewed merely use proxies for discretion proposed by
Hambrick and Finkelstein as indicators of discretion without testing their validity.6Studies that measure task
environment discretion with a continuous variable often use variants of Hambrick and Abrahamson’s
(1995) calculation of managerial discretion. While this provides some basis for measuring task environment
discretion, that study is nearly 20 years old and has never been replicated with its measures validated with other
samples.
Prior management research has suggested that “the substantive stream has been relatively overemphasized in
strategic management research without corresponding concern for measurement” (Venkatraman & Grant,
1986: 71). Validating measures provides construct validity and reduces the likelihood that measurement errors,
such as random error and method variance, bias results (Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991). Without further research
validating many commonly used proxies as indicators of discretion, research has not achieved construct validity
for many managerial discretion measures currently employed. Failing to achieve construct validity may yield
both Type I and II errors when researchers employ measures designed to represent managerial discretion.

Indeed, the limited studies performed to date examining managerial and task environment characteristics on
discretion find that not all proposed factors examined yield discretion. Relying upon Hambrick and Finkelstein’s
(1987) model as the basis for identifying measures of discretion is not enough to establish construct validity. In
order to accomplish this, researchers have several opportunities. First, as described in the previous section,
composite measures of discretion across the forces identified by Hambrick and Finkelstein could be evaluated to
determine whether managerial discretion serves as a higher order construct based on indicators of the latent
variables associated with each force. Second, future research could pilot additional studies with industry
experts, academics, and managers to assess the level of discretion in firms, industries, and nations and test the
validity of previously employed managerial discretion measures, in accordance with prior construct validation
studies. Measuring such variables with expert ratings would allow researchers to determine whether commonly
used proxies of discretion still are indicative of discretion. Finally, nonarchival methods, such as surveys,
interviews, and content analysis, should be used by researchers studying organizations to seek an in-depth
understanding of how discretionary forces influence executive decision making and perceived discretion. A
significant opportunity exists for researchers to identify and determine which factors yield discretion and
triangulate such proxies with alternative means of measuring discretion.7
Beyond an increased focus on methods used to examine managerial discretion, we call for research to further
examine causal relationships. For example, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) posited that a CEO’s power base
influences discretion, yet it is also reasonable to posit a reverse causation. Future research that also seeks to
illuminate potential causal paths that are not supported would greatly help disentangle the managerial
discretion construct from the psychological constructs that compose the managerial characteristics force.

Managerial Characteristics and Perceived Discretion

Our review identifies that significant research attention has been paid to the task environment’s influence on
managerial discretion, while a paucity of research focuses on managerial characteristics. Literature from
psychology provides a number of characteristics that alter how individuals perceive situations and make
decisions that would greatly enhance an executive’s perceived level of discretion. While gaining access to more
fine-grained data on top manager characteristics is a significant challenge for management researchers, a
number of important insights could be gained with access to such data. As noted earlier, the psychological
microfoundations of the manager can indicate whether he or she acts enabled or constrained. While locus of
control and other managerial characteristics detailed in the managerial discretion model may strongly influence
managerial discretion, several additional characteristics beyond the model could strongly affect managerial
discretion research, including domain-specific self-efficacy, executive confidence, and preference for novelty
versus stability.
Domain-specific self-efficacy refers to executives’ confidence that they can successfully carry out the tasks of
their leadership role, resulting in improved and sustained firm performance (Gist & Mitchell, 1992; Judge, Bono,
Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002). Domain specificity simply focuses Bandura’s (1977) concept of generalized self-efficacy
to the executive’s sphere of influence. Many of the managerial characteristics related to discretion, such as
commitment to the status quo and aspiration levels, are driven by whether executives believe that they can
control events and achieve positive outcomes. Furthermore, successful outcomes will increase executives’ selfefficacy within the firm and industry and, thus, will increase their perceived discretion (Lindsley, Brass, &
Thomas, 1995), while poor outcomes and performance will ultimately reduce executives’ perceived discretion.
An executive’s confidence may also affect the degree to which an executive perceives a need for change or
believes that actions taken will yield successful results (Moore & Healy, 2008). More confident CEOs invest in a
greater variety of projects (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). Thus, executives’ confidence influences their latitude of
action in undertaking certain decisions. Furthermore, insights based on domain-specific self-efficacy may

indicate that executives’ discretion changes over time as they gain confidence in their abilities as a manager,
suggesting that a manager’s perceived level of discretion may increase, possibly over the course of the
manager’s tenure in a top executive position (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). However, a series of poor decision
outcomes for a top executive over time may have the opposite effect, reducing his or her self-efficacy and, thus,
perceptions of discretion.
A third psychological microfoundation applicable to managerial discretion is a manager’s preference for novelty
versus stability. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) discuss how executives who are intolerant of ambiguity may
simply not consider actions that lack a clear “line of sight” in their execution. Such executives prioritize order
over developing new possible strategic directions. Alternatively, executives who embrace novelty are more likely
to be more innovative, encourage organizational playfulness, and lead their organization in addressing new
opportunities (Katsaros & Nicolaidis, 2012; Wilkinson, 2006).

The Institutional Environment and Managerial Discretion

Crossland and Hambrick (2007, 2011) illustrate how nation-level institutions affect the degree to which CEOs
matter to firm outcomes. This line of inquiry adds an important, fourth force related to managerial discretion:
the institutional environment. Insights from sociology on institutional analysis and from political science on
comparative political economy provide evidence of how institutions can both constrain and enable the behavior
of organizations (for a review, see J. L. Campbell, 2004: Chapter 1). While Crossland and Hambrick begin to
examine the role of institutions in altering executives’ latitude of action, considerable room still exists to
examine country-level traits that affect behavior and the role of institutional forces that limit behavior. For
instance, J. L. Campbell (2007) notes that governmental institutions can significantly alter firm behaviors, such as
social responsibility through regulation, but such regulations are also likely to have a stronger impact when
negotiated between the government and corporations. Furthermore, such regulations are likely to be effective
when self-instituted by a set of firms. Thus, either formal or informal norms created through a joint institution of
competing firms may limit managerial discretion by indicating a set of appropriate behaviors. Previously used
management concepts, such as power distance, openness, and level of referent power, may also significantly
influence the level of discretion provided by institutions. Finally, the presence of nongovernmental institutions
and third party stakeholders, such as watchdog agencies, may place pressure upon organizations to act in
certain manners (Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001), limiting the latitude of actions available to managers. Future
research should consider how such institutional pressures affect the discretion that is afforded to managers
independent of the organization’s immediate competitive task environment.

Managerial Discretion as a Time Varying Construct

Our review further indicates that research has examined managerial discretion as a static construct. Longitudinal
analyses on managerial discretion are likely to illustrate a complex interplay of discretion over time. In some
cases, events, such as changes in the task environment encountered by all firms in an industry, occur which may
alter managerial discretion. For example, the managerial discretion of U.S. airline executives was dramatically
constrained after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, shut down the industry for several days and
dramatically reduced the demand for air travel, with demand not recovering to pre–9/11 levels for 3 years
(Notis, 2005). In the close aftermath of 9/11, managerial discretion was severely reduced at most U.S. airlines to
actions primarily focused on avoiding bankruptcy. Such fluctuations in managerial discretion over time have
largely been absent from the literature.
Furthermore, changes in internal forces, such as the firm’s size, age, and powerful inside forces, such as the
composition of the board of directors and turnover of top managers following a CEO succession, may model
changes over time in discretion. However, only limited research examines how executives may influence their
level of managerial discretion over time. For instance, Westphal (1998) illustrates how executives use

ingratiation and persuasion toward board members when the board increases its independence to maintain
their influence. The limited work done in this area, however, primarily focuses on how executives employ power
and influence tactics against the board to achieve desired outcomes (e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; Zajac &
Westphal, 1996). While studies from agency theory explore how CEOs may gain domination of a board using
influence and nomination tactics, fewer studies, such as Westphal, have explored in-depth processes related to
influence and persuasion. Future studies may explore whether additional factors, such as firm performance or
CEO reputation or celebrity, may also enhance CEO discretion. For instance, poor performance may enhance
shareholder and board monitoring, reducing the latitude of action CEOs have. Alternatively, higher reputation
CEOs may gain more discretion given the positive beliefs regarding their actions.
Finally, as noted earlier, not all managerial characteristics are static. Executives’ domain-specific self-efficacy
may increase during their tenure as they become more familiar with the new position and learn more about the
task environment (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Lindsley et al., 1995). Therefore, over time, executives’
managerial characteristics may enhance their perceived level of discretion. Such arguments would be consistent
with prior research, such as Ocasio (1994), who finds that the level of an executive’s power changes during the
course of his or her tenure. Research could examine such characteristics that affect the degree to which
executives are likely to undertake significant strategic decisions within their firms. Alternatively, research also
shows that as executives achieve success, they become committed to an existing course of action or the status
quo (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000). Such commitment may reduce executives’ perceived level of discretion by
limiting the choices the executives perceive to preserve their legacy.

Managerial Discretion Forces as Substitutes Versus Complements

Insights and research from corporate governance (e.g., Rediker & Seth, 1995) and transactional governance
(e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002) suggest that mechanisms designed to control behavior may serve as
complementary forces or substitutes. From the substitution perspective, for example, significant monitoring
behavior by the board may be unnecessary if high-powered incentives align the interests of self-interested
managers with shareholders. A significant opportunity exists for managerial discretion scholars to examine
whether and under what conditions the forces identified as constraining or enabling discretion serve as
complements or substitutes or whether these forces complement or substitute for other firm activities. For
instance, when the task environment is highly regulated, overly competitive, and/or lacks product
differentiation, discretion is likely to be limited. In such cases, is it necessary for boards to closely monitor
managerial behavior to ensure managers do not act opportunistically? Alternatively, further managerial
discretion research may yield insights to corporate governance research by suggesting that when discretion is
high, corporate governance mechanisms may be more necessary and beneficial. Whether discretionary forces
serve as complements or substitutes has interesting implications for both organizations and individuals.

Organizational consequences

Research from corporate governance suggests that organizations perceive governance mechanisms as
complements (Schepker & Oh, 2013). With regard to discretion, multiple forces may complement each other to
enhance discretion or serve as substitutes, with limited forces needed only to constrain such discretion. If
discretion forces serve as complements, executives are likely to have greatest control when their characteristics,
the internal organization, and the task environment provide greater discretion. In these situations, outcomes
would be expected to be highly variable with managers receiving greater compensation. Furthermore, such
firms may be more likely to lack strategic conformity and commitment to the status quo. Alternatively,
discretion may be most limited when managerial characteristics, internal forces, and the task environment all
constrain discretion, likely leading to strategic persistence and few strategic choices undertaken. If forces serve
as complements, future research could illustrate how these forces work together to further alter variability of
outcomes.

If managerial discretion forces serve as substitutes, a different story arises. For instance, powerful inside forces
may not limit managerial discretion when other discretionary forces, such as the manager’s characteristics or
the institutional environment, limit perceived discretion. Consistent with perspectives on governance
mechanisms as substitutes, powerful monitoring by inside forces may yield only costs to the organization
without any additional benefits. From an agency theory perspective, governance mechanisms may be less
necessary when the manager’s characteristics or the task environment constrain discretion. Alternatively, firms
may need to be more conscious of the need for strong monitoring when managers’ characteristics lead
managers to perceive greater discretion and/or when the task environment yields discretion. Discretion may
inform agency theory research on corporate governance such that corporate governance mechanisms may be
most necessary and beneficial when discretion is high, as executives have the greatest ability to pursue their
own self-interests. Failure to appropriately monitor behavior may exacerbate potential problems related to
discretion.
A final situation may arise where an executive’s characteristics lead to him or her lacking (having) discretion at
the individual level while operating in a high (low) discretion environment. In such situations, the individual may
undertake or fail to undertake decisions that are consistent with the environment in which the executive’s firm
operates, thus either destroying value or failing to capture value creating opportunities. Additionally, if the
environment in which the firm operates or various organizational forces constrain executives’ latitude of action
associated with strategic decisions, such as product development and marketing, the executives (driven by their
psychological traits) may focus on other areas where they feel they can have a greater influence. Indeed,
executives may have significant discretion towards some types of organizational decisions and outcomes while
having little in other types. Future research should consider what types of organizational actions discretion limits
and whether all actions are affected by discretion or whether only certain types of organizational actions may be
affected. In short, organizations, executives, and boards of directors should be aware of and understand how
each of the four discretion forces affects their organizations and account for them appropriately. Future
research can examine the interplay between different levels of discretion to understand how each type of
discretion differentially and interactively affects executive decision making across the firm’s operational and
strategic domains and firm-level outcomes. Research on discretion could greatly benefit from a discussion of
which discretionary forces complement and substitute each other and under which conditions. This line of
inquiry could have significant implications for researchers in additional fields, such as corporate governance.

Individual outcomes

Discretion has primarily been examined from an organizational perspective with research failing to examine how
perceptions of discretion influence individual managers. Microresearch may reveal psychological and career
consequences for managers affected by different levels of managerial discretion. First, psychology research
notes that the fit between an individual and his or her environment is an important consideration “that
necessarily includes one’s compatibility with multiple systems in the work environment” (Kristof-Brown, Jansen,
& Colbert, 2002: 985). Thus, choosing an appropriate organization and environment for an individual is an
important concern for individuals (Rynes & Cable, 2003). Aligning an individual with his or her organization is
related to job performance, organizational citizenship behavior, turnover, job satisfaction, and commitment
(Hoffman & Woehr, 2006; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005).
An important consideration for executives is whether they are placed in a situation where they can exercise the
appropriate amount of discretion for their own satisfaction. For instance, an executive with an internal locus of
control may feel hampered when placed in an older firm with an established, resistant culture. The executive
may feel that efforts to change the organization are thwarted and may experience negative personal outcomes,
such as job dissatisfaction or greater intentions to quit. Firms should understand that selecting high discretion
executives in a low discretion environment may yield greater turnover, which may lead to major consequences

for the firm as it cycles through executives. Such frustration is also likely to increase stress and anxiety, while low
discretion managers in high discretion environments are likely to face greater perceived job demands (Hambrick,
Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005). Future research could examine the role that fit between a potential executive and
the firm’s environment plays in selecting the appropriate executive. Furthermore, research should examine how
mismatches in the executive’s personal discretion and the organization and environment’s afforded discretion
influence negative outcomes for executives, including stress and anxiety. For instance, Jex and Beehr
(1991) note that organizational constraints increase the level of stress experienced. Their research further
illustrates that such stress leads to strains, which affect employee health and well-being. Discretion researchers
may be able to utilize such research to examine the effects of such strain in executives who fail to fit in their
organization or environment. Failure to consider such outcomes may yield both poor strategic outcomes and
poor individual outcomes.
Applying the managerial discretion construct to other management disciplines can provide greater meaning and
understanding to those disciplines. For instance, researchers might examine the value of constructs such as
organizational commitment, organizational identity, and organizational citizenship behaviors in high discretion
industries (e.g., foods/beverages) versus low discretion industries (e.g., public utilities). While such employee
traits and behaviors may always be highly desirable, understanding their value in different industry
environments may provide a greater grasp of when and how resources should be used to develop and enhance
these traits and behaviors. Additionally, while one study has shown that the effectiveness of high performance
work systems is enhanced in industries with higher discretion (Datta et al., 2005), additional research should
examine whether discretion has implications for how employees are managed, developed, and rewarded.

Managerial Discretion Within the Organization

Our review also indicates the role that managerial discretion plays at the organizational level with regard to
outcomes such as firm performance variability, commitment to a defined course of action, or even CEO
compensation. Absent from research, however, is the level of discretion that middle managers within an
organization perceive. The role of organizational members outside of the TMT, such as middle managers, in
influencing internal outcomes is also important. Studies on change management and strategy implementation
suggest that middle-level managers are important conduits for explaining changes in strategy and ensuring that
strategy is implemented appropriately. Effective strategy implementation is likely to require discretion at all
levels of the organization to implement actions that are consistent with the strategy composed by the
organization’s leaders. For instance, prior research identifies five antecedents to middle-level manager
entrepreneurial behavior: (1) management support, (2) work discretion and autonomy, (3) rewards and
reinforcement, (4) time availability, and (5) organizational boundaries (Kuratko, Ireland, Covin, & Hornsby,
2005). In short, research provides evidence that organizations can promote behavior by middle managers that
leads to positive outcomes. Failure to provide discretion to managers hampers their ability to implement the
strategy without effectively seeking approval and limits the speed at which strategy may be implemented.
Future research should continue to further consider the role of discretion directly on internal strategy
implementation and the role that middle managers play in implementing strategy.

Conclusion
Strategy studies have long considered the ability of executives to affect organizational strategic decision making.
However, upon the publication of Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) discussion of managerial discretion,
research began more thoroughly examining the forces that affect managerial latitude of actions, leading
executives to have stronger effects. While this research has extended our knowledge of how and when
executives matter, there are many important and challenging questions that remain open for researchers. As
research on managerial discretion continues to grow, it is important to ensure we have a strong understanding

of what yields discretion. Additionally, work is needed to develop more robust ways to measure discretion and
how it can change over time. Furthermore, significant questions still abound with regard to how executive
characteristics and internal factors affect the level of discretion managers perceive. Finally, understanding how
these factors interact to further affect executive decision making remains a strong avenue for researchers to
consider.
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Notes
1.Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) also posited that powerful internal stakeholders may be extraordinarily
confident as a result of past successes (March & Simon, 1958) or may have tremendous zeal for
traditional prioritization of actions (Peters & Waterman, 1982).
2.The following journals were considered “top journals” in our literature review: Academy of Management
Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied
Psychology, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Management
Studies, Strategic Management Journal, Management Science, and Organization Science.
3.Google’s Web site ranks articles for relevance in the following manner:
Google Scholar aims to rank documents the way researchers do, weighing the full text of each document, where it was published, who it
was written by, as well as how often and how recently is has been cited in other scholarly literature.
(http://scholar.google.com/intl/en-US/scholar/about.html)

While Google does not release their specific ranking algorithm, we feel strongly that these are richer criteria
than citations since it reduces the potential of missing more recent articles. Furthermore, since Google
Scholar’s algorithm accounts for journal quality, recent articles in high quality journals are likely to be
higher on the relevance list.
4.During our review process, we felt that several articles prior to 1987 strongly operationalized forces in
the Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) model (e.g., Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Miller et al., 1982).
5.We are grateful to one reviewer for suggesting the need for future research that discriminates the managerial
discretion construct from closely related psychological antecedents.
6.Proxies for task environment–provided discretion include comparing industries selected for research described
as either being high or low in managerial discretion. In some cases, industry selections in studies are
justified by researchers using qualitative descriptions of the industry as either providing high or low
latitude of action to industry top managers. In other studies, researchers may corroborate an industry
selection as having either high or low discretion on the basis of quantitative differences with other
industries on variables theorized to affect managerial discretion, such as capital intensity, regulation, or
industry growth.
7.For exemplars in management research in attempting to assess construct validity, see Bagozzi et al.
(1991) and Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel (1993).
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